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A controversial law curbing the power of Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies sparked widespread protest. A second legislative amendment, passed by the Ukrainian parliament just days after the initial vote, ultimately prevented the curtailment of the agencies’ independence. Legal scholar Prof. Roman Petrov provides background on the legislative changes and explains what the controversy reveals about the country’s political system and its relationship with the European Union.

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Over 10,000 people defied martial law to protest the anti-corruption law, which was later repealed by a parliamentary decision on July 31 (Copyright Imago/ Ukrinform).

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 A controversial anti-corruption law sparked protests across Ukraine before being overturned on July 31 2025. What exactly did the initial law amendment propose — and what ultimately led to its repeal?

Before its repeal, Law No. 12414 — adopted by the Ukrainian Parliament on July 22 — sought to place the country’s key anti-corruption institutions, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialized Anti- Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) under the authority of the General Prosecutor’s Office. This move effectively curtailed their institutional independence and triggered immediate concern both domestically and internationally.

From a legal standpoint, the attempt to undermine the special status of these bodies was extremely dubious. The legislative process lacked transparency and proceeded without any form of public debate. However, despite mounting criticism, President Zelenskyi signed the law on the very day it was passed, prompting spontaneous demonstrations across the country. In defiance of martial law, which explicitly prohibits public gatherings, more than 10,000 protesters — primarily young people — assembled in vicinity of the Presidential Office in Kyiv and in cities across Ukraine.

Faced with growing unrest at home — but even more so with mounting pressure from the EU and some EU Member States — President Zelenskyi reversed the course. Just nine days later, the Parliament of Ukraine convened for an extraordinary session during its summer break to adopt a new law. Only days before, 263 MPs had backed the controversial curbs. This time, the Parliament voted unanimously — all 340 MPs present (9 MPs of 340 MPs miraculously disappeared and did not vote at all) — to repeal the law. The new legislation (No. 13533), passed by the Parliament on July 31 and signed into law by President Zelenskyi the same day, eventually restored the independence and competences of NABU and SAPO.

What exactly are NABU and SAPO — the institutions targeted by the now-repealed law — and what functions do they concretely perform within Ukraine’s anti-corruption system?

The recently repealed law targeted NABU and SAPO — two key institutions within Ukraine’s anti-corruption system. Alongside them stands a third body: the High Anti-Corruption Court of Ukraine (HACC), which was not directly affected by this legislation saga.

Together, NABU, SAPO, and HACC form a specialised institutional trio established after the 2014 Revolution of Dignity and the onset of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Created with strong EU backing in line with the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, these bodies were designed to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate high-level corruption cases independently from Ukraine’s conventional justice and law-enforcement systems.

NABU and SAPO are quite unique and can be described as ad hoc law enforcement bodies, with hardly any equivalents in other EU Member States (there are only similar institutions in Romania and Bulgaria that duly established cooperation with NABU/SAPO). They operate in tandem. NABU is essentially an investigative body — comparable to the FBI in the United States, but with a narrow focus on high-level corruption. SAPO, on the other hand, is a specialized prosecution body designed to supervise NABU and ensure that it remains independent and free from corrupt influence. The High Anti-Corruption Court represents the judiciary branch of power.

As for the actual results of their work, NABU and SAPO succeeded in fostering a strong public perception of being actively engaged in the fight against corruption. NABU, in particular, gained public visibility by launching investigations that led to high-profile arrests and visible action against corruption at the top. One of the most prominent cases was the 2023 arrest of Chief Justice Serhiy Knyazev, who had been seen as a symbol of judicial reform in Ukraine. The NABU uncovered a corruption network within the Supreme Court, leading to further arrests. Earlier, in 2017, the head of the State Fiscal Service, Roman Nasirov, was arrested over bribery allegations.

These cases created a ‘wow effect’ both domestically and internationally, especially as traditional institutions often failed to produce credible results. Over time, NABU and SAPO came to symbolise evident progress of Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms, particularly in the context of EU accession. However, it is probably overestimated how effective those institutions are. In 2024, NABU opened 113 investigations involving 232 individuals. While it is difficult to assess what these numbers truly indicate, for me one question arises: do high-profile cases reflect genuine institutional strength — or merely effective public relations?

Against this background, what do you see as the main motives or circumstances that triggered the initial attempt to change the legislation curbing the powers of NABU and SAPO?

I can only presume what has been going on behind the scenes. From my perspective, this legislative operation had likely been in preparation for quite some time, carefully planned and orchestrated. The arrests of alleged Russian spies within the NABU shortly before the new law No. 12414 was adopted provided a convenient pretext. It allowed the government to justify what amounts to a legislative coup under martial law. I see three key indications that this initiative was likely aimed at consolidating power— whether for President Zelenskyi or a future successor:

First, current discussions about a potential peace deal between Russia and Ukraine are closely tied to upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine. Zelenskyi and his team may have decided it was time to lay a good ground for an election campaign — and that doing so required shielding key figures from political or legal risk (existing or potential investigations by the NABU). The timing of the vote — one day before the summer break — suggests an attempt to quietly push the law through the Parliament of Ukraine.

Observers have pointed to possible NABU investigations involving individuals close to the president. Just days before the amendment was passed, the government underwent a reshuffle, including the abrupt dismissal of Olha Stefanishyna, Vice Prime Minister for European Integration and Minister of Justice. As the 'EU accession queen', she was removed without reassignment, despite her long-standing experience and strong ties to Brussels. Notably, NABU had opened an investigation into her a few months earlier.

Second, President Zelenskyi may have taken a calculated risk — assuming that the EU would not openly confront him. He likely expected that pushing the reform through under martial law would go largely unnoticed. After all, it would not have been the first time the EU, particularly the European Commission, chose to look the other way for the sake of non-compromising public support of Ukraine’s war efforts in the EU and beyond. What came as a surprise, however, was not only the strength of the EU’s eventual reaction — but also the emergence of street protests inside Ukraine, especially among young people in Kyiv. Given that public demonstrations are prohibited under martial law, such mobilization was unexpected. When the protests broke out, the government refrained from using force — likely recalling the violent crackdown of youth protests by former President Yanukovych in December 2013, which ultimately triggered the ‘Revolution of Dignity’.

Third, I see this move as part of a broader attempt to question intense monitoring and interference of Western institutions and governments, mainly the EU and the USA, into reforms in Ukraine. There is a growing number of politicians and public figures in Ukraine who are critical of what they perceive as excessive EU interference — particularly in the judiciary. On the day of the parliamentary vote, terms like ‘Soros followers’ and ‘grant-eaters’ were openly used to discredit pro-European voices within Ukraine. Former prime minister of Ukraine, long-term opposition leader and formerly pro-European voice Julia Tymoshenko publicly supported the adoption of Law No. 12414 and criticized the limitation of the Ukrainian sovereignty caused by excessive competences of the NABU and the SAPO.

Turning to the most recent developments: what explains this sudden reversal — from broad parliamentary support for curbing NABU and SAPO’s powers to unanimous repeal within just a few days?

The events surrounding the adoption and rapid repeal of Law No. 12414 reveal fundamental weaknesses in Ukraine’s political system. Although the Constitution defines the country as a parliamentary-presidential republic, the political reality tells a different story. Since Volodymyr Zelenskyi’s election in 2019, Ukraine has functioned more like a presidential republic. The ruling party, Servant of the People, was essentially built around Zelenskyi himself and owes its parliamentary majority to his personal popularity. As a result, he has made use of this pattern to push legislation through parliament with minimal resistance. It follows that the entrenched habit of endorsing most draft laws backed by the Office of the President worked also against Ukraine’s Parliament on 22 July 2025.

Yet the subsequent adoption of Law No. 13533 — supported not only by pro- presidential factions but also by the opposition — demonstrated two patterns of contemporary political life in Ukraine. First, no political party in Ukraine is interested in escalation of domestic political conflict that could eventually trigger negative effects on the frontline and endanger the ability of Ukraine to resist the external aggression. Second, all political forces in Ukraine got genuinely alarmed by the negative effect Law No. 12414 caused on allies and external partners. There was no other way but to display a convincing unity of political forces in in moments of acute crisis in Ukraine.

It also underscored a broader truth — that the EU remains the only credible external actor capable of influencing domestic political developments in Ukraine.

What was the EU trying to safeguard by responding so decisively?

What makes NABU and SAPO so important is their central role in the EU accession process. On the Ukrainian side, the activities of the ‘anti-corruption trio’ — NABU, SAPO, and HACC — have remained the most compelling proof of the country’s efforts to comply with the ‘fundamentals’ cluster of the EU acquis during the EU membership negotiations. Over the years, the EU and its member states consistently pointed to NABU and SAPO as concrete progress in the area of judicial reform.

But what is at stake is not only Ukraine’s EU accession, but also the credibility of the EU itself. Had these bodies' independence been undermined without consequence, it would have marked a serious setback — not just for Kyiv’s EU path, but for the EU’s entire values-based enlargement agenda. Countries like Moldova and Georgia, which are on similar trajectories, would likely have drawn their own conclusions. EU-critical states such as Hungary or Slovakia would have seized on the moment — pointing to the EU’s hypocrisy or weakness as proof that its rule-of-law agenda amounts to little more than costly paperwork. Georgia, after all, has already reversed key reforms. Had Ukraine followed, the damage to the EU’s legitimacy might have been irreparable. It would have been a heavy — perhaps unbearable — political blunder for long-cherished EU aspiration of Ukraine.

This is precisely why President Zelenskyi’s recent initiative — threatening the autonomy of these institutions — came as such a shock and disappointment in Brussels. The EU, in short, cannot afford to lose Ukraine as a partner. And ironically, despite being seen as ‘the bad boy behind the school corner,’ Zelenskyi remains only the EU’s reliable bridgehead to war-torn Ukraine and its pro-European future. On the other hand, with U.S. support waning, Brussels remains Zelenskyi’s only reliable tool of financial and political support against the mighty and ruthless aggressor. A few phone calls were enough to defuse what could have escalated into a full-blown institutional crisis. Zelenskyi backed down not out of strength, but because he had no room to manoeuvre. So at this critical juncture — with a war ongoing and accession talks ahead — neither side can walk away. Their relationship increasingly resembles that of adoptive parents and a child: deeply connected, not always aligned, but bound by shared long-term commitments.

After all, the law was repealed and institutional independence restored. Would you still consider that very fact a success?

Well, you might say: ‘Wonderful. We avoided a crisis – a success story.’ But no. This is only the tip of the iceberg. The political process in Ukraine is already shifting. This remains a highly volatile situation, given the ongoing war with Russia, escalating losses and no peace deal in sight.

Recent events reveal something deeper: politically, the volcano is heating up. Vesuvius is rumbling. These are early signs of how layered and fragile the situation within the Ukrainian political establishment really is. Sooner or later, it will erupt – most likely once martial law ends and a peace deal is in sight. The political landscape is highly fragmented: many competing interests, many domestic and external centres of power want to be engaged. For now, everything appears under control – but that control is fragile. The magma is rising. It is unstable, volatile – and it may erupt.

Expert: Prof. Roman Petrov is Jean Monnet Chair in EU Law and Head of the
Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence of EU Studies at the National University of
Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. His research focuses on EU law, EU-external relations
and Ukraine’s alignment with EU norms and accession prospects. Prof. Petrov
frequently advises key state institutions while serving as an EU law expert to
the European Parliament and the Energy Community Secretariat.

 


Interview: Belinda Nüssel, Competence Network Interdisciplinary Ukrainian Studies (KIU) Frankfurt (Oder) – Berlin, Science Communication Officer